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People v. Swan

(decided June 22, 1990)

The defendant, convicted of first degree murder, first degree
attempted murder, first degree attempted manslaughter, and two
counts of first degree criminal use of a firearm contended, inter
alia,338 that his enhanced sentence upon reconviction violated his
due process rights guaranteed by the state constitution. 339 The
court held that the defendant's procedural due process rights were
not violated by the enhanced sentence. 340
During the initial trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of
murdering a New York State trooper and attempting to murder
another. After the defendant was convicted, the trial judge
imposed an indeterminate prison sentence aggregating thirty-five
years. The defendant successfully appealed his conviction on the
grounds that the trial judge denied his state constitutional right to
waive a jury trial3 41 and denied him a fair trial by failing to
337. 158 A.D.2d 158, 557 N.Y.S.2d 791 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 76
N.Y.2d 991, 565 N.E.2d 529, 563 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1990).
338. Id. at 160, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 792. The defendant also contended that he
was denied a fair trial because: 1) he was indicted before an improper grand
jury; 2) the trial court failed to order a competency hearing; 3) the
prosecution's witness made a reference to a notorious would-be assassin; 4) the
prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant's psychiatrist was improper;,
5) thejury was informed about the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
dismiss on the grounds of insufficient evidence; and 6) a statement he made
while at a hospital was improperly admitted into evidence. Id. at 160-62, 557
N.Y.S.2d at 792-94.
339. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
340. Swan, 158 A.D.2d at 163, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
341. See People v. Swan, 130 A.D.2d 6, 8, 519 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582 (4th
Dep't 1987) (citing People v. Davis, 49 N.Y.2d 114, 400 N.E.2d 313, 424
N.Y.S.2d 372 (1979); People v. Duchin, 12 N.Y.2d 351, 190 N.E.2d 17, 239
N.Y.S.2d 670 (1963); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2).
Article I, section 2 provides, in pertinent part:
Ajury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except
those in which the crime charged may be punishable by death, by a
written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court
before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court having
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question the jury about possible prejudice regarding a prolonged
2
delay of trial. 3 4
Upon retrial before a different judge, the defendant was again
convicted of the same charges. This trial judge, however,
increased the defendant's sentence to forty-two years. The reason
for the increase was that the original trial judge incorrectly sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of
five to fifteen years for attempted murder. The correct sentence
for such an offense, according to the second trial judge, was a
minimum of fifteen years to life imprisonment. 343 In its opinion,
the court ruled that People v. Van Pelt,344 which created a presumption of institutional vindictiveness and therefore called for
the second trial judge to articulate a cognizable reason for
imposing an enhanced sentence, was inapplicable under the
circumstances of the defendant's resentencing. The court found
that since the enhanced sentencing following retrial and
conviction was invalid, the defendant "received the sentence he
should have received following his original conviction. ' ' 345
Accordingly, Van Pelt was inapplicable because the second trial
judge was merely correcting the illegal and improper sentence
imposed by the first trial judge and not imposing a harsher
sentence based on information learned subsequent to the
defendant's first conviction.

jurisdiction to try the offense.
N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 2.
342. Swan, 130 A.D.2d at 10, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 583.

343. Swan, 158 A.D.2d at 162-63, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (citing N.Y.
§ 70.00(2)(a), (3)(a)(i) (McKinney 1987)).
344. 76 N.Y.2d 156, 556 N.E.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1990).
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345. Swan, 158 A.D.2d at 163, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
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